adopted on or before March 8th,—that is, before the Confederates evacuated Manassas. General McClellan says in his Memoirs :

" The fears of the Administration and their inability to comprehend the merits of the [Urbana] scheme, or else the determination that I should not succeed in the approaching campaign, induced them to prohibit me from carrying out the Urbana movement They gave me the choice between the direct overland route *via* Manassas, and the route with Fort Monroe as a base. Of course I selected the Latter."

General McOlellan does not state the date when this change of plan was decided on; but we find a letter from him to the Secretary of War, dated March 11, which was Tuesday, in which he says :

" I propose . . . throwing all the forces I can concentrate *upon the line agreed upon last Week?* The *Monitor* justifies this course."

The "week" to which reference is here made began on Sunday, March 2, and ended on Saturday, March 8. It was therefore at some time between these dates that the agreement as to the line of operations was arrived at. The statement that "the *Monitor* justifies this course " is conclusive on the point that it was the line of operation from Fort Monroe as a base which was the subject of the agree-

ment; for it was this line of operatioiw which the unexpected and overwhelming HueceHHen of the new Confederate ironclad *Merriwutc,* won on March 8th over the *Congress* and *OuMerhnd* frigates, put in

[1] McClelland 0. S., 227.
[8] 5 W. R., 742. [8] The italics are our*.